C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 FLORENCE 000022

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/3/2019
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC SM
SUBJECT: SAN MARINO: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES--INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING,AND SHARING

REF: STATE 032287

CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Ellen Countryman, CG, Florence, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) The following are post's answers to the questionnaire
in Reftel for the Republic of San Marino.

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¶2. (SBU) Section A: Immigration Data Bases and Traveler
Information Collection

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-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits?

A: There is no data base for tracking entries and exits. The
Republic of San Marino (RSM) is bordered on all sides by the
country of Italy and the nearest commercial airport is located
in Rimini, Italy, so the only commercial access to the RSM is
through Italy. As set forth in the 1939 Agreement of Friendship
and Good Neighborhood with Italy, the RSM does not have border
security controls. Therefore, persons traveling from Italy to
San Marino (and vice versa) do not pass through any border
security or immigration checkpoints at the ports of entry (POE),
and their entry/exit is not documented. Since all travelers to
San Marino must arrive via Italy, the RSM essentially depends
upon the Government of Italy (GOI) to screen travelers.

-- Is the computerized immigration database available at all
POEs?

A: N/A

-- If immigrant databases are available at some POEs, but not
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will receive
the tool?

A: N/A

-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems?

A: N/A

-- How often are national immigration databases updated?

A: N/A

-- What are the country's policies on collecting information
from travelers arriving in the country?

A: The RSM does not collect information on travelers arriving
in the country.

-- Are there different policies for entry and exit at air, sea,
and land POEs and for domestic flights?

A: The RSM is not accessible from the sea, and the nearest
commercial airport is located in Rimini, Italy. Therefore,
travelers arrive by land by crossing the border from Italy.

-- What agency oversees the collection of traveler information?

A: N/A

-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that
information with foreign governments?

A: N/A

-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR)
data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?

A: There are no commercial flights or vessels that enter RSM
territory.

-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been effective
at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted
criminals?

A: N/A

¶3. (SBU) Section B. Watchlisting:

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-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?

A: There is no such watchlist system; travelers at POEs are not
screened.

-- What domestic sources of information populate the name-based
watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts,

criminal wants/warrants?

A: N/A

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-- What international watchlists does the host government use
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists,
UN, etc.?

A: Travelers at POEs are not screened.

4.. (SBU) Biometrics:

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-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, land,
sea)? If no, does host government have plans to install such a
system? If biometric systems are available

at some POEs, but not all, how does the host government decide
which POEs will receive the tool?
A: There are no border controls nor are there plans to install
biometric systems at POEs.

-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics,
gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant?

A: N/A

¶5. (SBU) Border Control and Screening:

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-- Does the host government employ software to screen travelers
of security interest?

A: No, travelers are not screened.

¶6. (SBU) Passports:

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-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government share
the public key required to read the biometric information with
any other governments?

A: The RSM issues machine-readable passports with biometric
data chips embedded within them. Governments can access the
biometric data through the Basic Access Control mechanism.

-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full or limited validity (i.e. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?

A: In case of loss or theft, the RSM does not issue a
replacement passport but will issue a new fully-valid biometric
passport.

-- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures
for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who
have reported their passports stolen multiple times?

A: The RSM does not have special procedures in place for
dealing with "habitual" losers of passports.

-- Are replacement passports of the same or difference
appearance and page length as regular passports? Do emergency
replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields
as regular-issue passports?

A: N/A

-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number of replacement or "clean" passports used to apply for
U.S. visas?

A: No

¶7. (SBU) Fraud Detection

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-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances
of fraud involving documents followed up?

A: The RSM experiences only low levels of fraud and fraud
detection is not a robust operation. However, the RSM passport
is a very fraud-resistant travel document.

-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out
of circulation, or made harder to use?

A: Such documents would be taken out of circulation and
examined by the issuing authority and law enforcement with a
view towards avoiding future cases of fraud.

¶8. (SBU) Privacy and Data Security

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-- What are the country's policies on records related to the
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered at
points of entry into the country?

A: Travelers are not screened or questioned at the POE.

¶9. (C) Identifying Appropriate Partners:

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--   Are there political realities which would preclude a country
from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the
U.S.?

A: The RSM is proud of its excellent relations with the United
States. However, the reality is that because travelers may
freely enter or exit San Marino without being screened,
questioned, or even stopped, the RSM essentially relies on Italy
for screening all visitors. The RSM has no border or homeland
security police, intelligence activity is forbidden, and much of
the information in files maintained by the Office for Foreigners
in the Central Headquarters of the Gendarmes is received from
the GOI. The lack of information gathered and maintained by the
RSM on travelers means that the benefits from partnering with it
would be of limited value.

--   How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statues that do so?

A: San Marino Republic law No. 92 (June 17, 2008) defines
terrorism as "A behavior against the constitutional order, the
regulations of international law, and the statute of
international organizations, intended to cause hardship to
citizens and things, with the purpose of forcing the
institutions of the Republic, or a foreign country or of
international organizations, to perform or keep from performing
any action, or to threaten the entire population or part of it,
or to destabilize or destroy the political, constitutional,
economic and social structures of the Republic, of a foreign
country or of an international organization."
COUNTRYMAN